ABSTRACT: My aim is to raise two points against naturalizing epistemology. First, against Quine's version of naturalizing epistemology, I claim that the traditional. The source of much of the recent interest in Naturalized Epistemology is W.V.O Quine's celebrated essay, "Epistemology Naturalized" (Quine,  ‎Replacement Naturalism · ‎Cooperative Naturalism · ‎Substantive Naturalism. The term 'naturalized epistemology' was introduced by W. V. Quine in his essay 'Epistemology Naturalized', in which he argues that epistemology should.


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Epistemology Naturalized

Advocates of a naturalized epistemology see the role of epistemology very differently. For them, philosophy does not come prior to science. The quine naturalized epistemology point of epistemology should not be our introspective awareness of our own conscious experience, but rather the conception of the larger world that we get from common sense and science.

quine naturalized epistemology Of the three main epistemological issues, i. Replacement naturalism[ edit ] W. Quine's version of naturalized epistemology considers reasons for serious doubt about the fruitfulness of traditional philosophic quine naturalized epistemology of scientific knowledge.

But also, because of the contemporaneous attempts and failures to reduce mathematics to pure logic by those in or philosophically sympathetic to The Vienna Circle. He concludes that studies of scientific knowledge concerned with meaning or truth fail to achieve the Cartesian goal of certainty.

Naturalized Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring Edition)

The failures in the reduction of mathematics to pure logic imply that scientific knowledge can at best be defined with quine naturalized epistemology aid of less certain set-theoretic notions.

Even if set theory's lacking the certainty of pure logic is deemed acceptable, the usefulness of constructing an encoding of scientific quine naturalized epistemology as logic and set theory is undermined by the inability to construct a useful translation from logic and set-theory back to scientific knowledge.

It is possible that naturalists tend to focus on different questions: Can we show that we do have knowledge in one area or another? In the various areas do we in fact tend to draw the right conclusions from the evidence we do have?

Naturalized Epistemology

Are the processes we actually use reliable ones? Quine seemed to take the question to be whether our actual scientific beliefs had a firm foundation. The goal was to "reconstruct" our knowledge. There is no doubt that answering these questions requires empirical input. While we can from our armchairs have some ideas about the sorts of inferences we quine naturalized epistemology and the reliability of the processes that occur in us, detailed scientific information is needed to have a clear picture of quine naturalized epistemology actual practices.


Furthermore, information about the sorts of errors and mistakes we are apt to make about specific topics is vital to assessing the merits of our actual beliefs about those topics.

Claims to the effect that actual people know actual facts about the quine naturalized epistemology are contingent propositions about the world.

They cannot be known a priori. Perhaps such things can be known from our armchairs, since we can know quite a bit from our armchairs. It is difficult to see why we quine naturalized epistemology know some things about knowledge from our armchairs. Still, information from empirical sciences cannot be irrelevant to issues about what people actually know.

We quine naturalized epistemology plausibly judge from our armchairs that we have knowledge in some range of cases.

It is possible that cognitive science will discover that in some or all of these cases our beliefs result from bizarre, thoroughly unreliable, deviant causal chains. If that were to happen, we might learn that we lack knowledge in cases where we thought we had it.

Though the possibility that we will learn such things in a variety of familiar cases is extremely small, quine naturalized epistemology is not zero. Quine naturalized epistemology empirical results could overturn our judgments about these cases.

  • Naturalistic Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Naturalized epistemology - Wikipedia
  • W. V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized - PhilPapers
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